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THE FUTURE OF IOLTA:  HAS THE DEATH KNELL BEEN SOUNDED FOR MANDATORY 
IOLTA PROGRAMS? 
 
“While the final nail has not been pounded into the IOLTA coffin, the next to the 
last one has.”1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In Ohio,2 a battered wife is being challenged by her ex-husband for custody of their 
son.3  Due to the fact that she is indigent4 and cannot afford an attorney, she must rely 
on legal aid services in her custody battle.5  The scarcity of legal aid services6 requires 
her to compete for legal services with a seventy-four year old gentlemen who was a 
recent target in an elaborate scam which bilked him of much of his pension, and an 
elderly woman being unfairly evicted from her apartment so it can be torn down to 
accommodate a new development.7    
                    
1  IOLTA May Be Invalid - U.S. Supreme Court, LAW. WLKY. U.S.A., June 29, 1998, at 2. 
(quoting Richard Samp, Washington Legal Foundation Chief Counsel, commenting on the 
United States Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 118 S. 
Ct. 1925 (1998)). 
2  Ohio is a mandatory IOLTA state. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4705.09(A)(2) (Banks-Baldwin 
1998).  “IOLTA” is an acronym for Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts.  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 828 (6th ed. 1990) “In some states, lawyers turn over such interest to public 
service institutions.”  Id.  The majority of the interest earned on lawyers’ trust accounts is in 
turn used to fund legal services for the poor.  IOLTA May Be Invalid, supra note 1, at 2. In 
Ohio, interest earned on lawyers trust accounts must be turned over to the State Treasurer.  § 
4705.09(B).  The Treasurer in turn deposits the money into a legal aid fund.  Id.  For a look at 
how the legal aid fund was established, see § 120.52. 
3  This fictitious fact pattern is modeled after an example in Edward F. Hennessey, Legal 
Services Program for the Poor is Still Alive, BOSTON GLOBE, July 25, 1998, at A15. 
4  For the purposes of determining financial assistance to legal aid societies in Ohio, an 
“indigent” is defined as “a person or persons whose income is not greater than one hundred 
twenty-five per cent of the current poverty threshold established by the United States office 
of management and budget.”  § 120.51(B). 
5  The Legal Services Corporation was created in 1974 under the Nixon Administration 
with the goal of assuring low income citizens across the country access to the legal system.  
Katherine Elrich, Note, Equal Justice Under the Law (If You Can Afford It): Fifth Circuit 
Threatens Texas’ IOLTA Program: Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to 
Justice Foundation, 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 887, 897 (1997).  Currently, the Legal Services 
Corporation is a federally funded corporate entity that provides grants “to local poverty law 
groups” which in turn provide legal services to the poor.  David A. Price, Legal Services’ 
Stealth Funding, INV. BUS. DAILY, October 15, 1996 at A1.  Legal Services Corporation also 
relies heavily on monies received from IOLTA programs.  Id.  For more information on the 
Legal Services Corporation, visit their web site at Legal Services Corporation (visited Oct. 1, 
1998) <http://www.cuberus.ca/~ppp/profiles/legal_se.htm>.  
6  See, e.g., Price, supra note 5, at A1 (stating that in 1996, Congress cut funding for the 
Legal Services Corporation by thirty percent). 
7  These facts are fictitious.  The reality lies in the fact that many of Legal Services 
Corporation’s cases involve evictions and child custody cases.   Price, supra note 5, at A1.  
In 1995 alone, over 500,000 of Legal Services Corp’s cases involved family law.  Id.  Over 
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The United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel.8 
 However, it does not afford a civil litigant similar protection.9  The troubled individuals 
previously discussed must either rely on legal aid services or face the daunting task of 
pro se10 representation.11 
 
Legal aid services receive much of their funding from programs such as Interest on 
Lawyers’ Trust Accounts (IOLTA).12  The main purpose of an IOLTA program is to 
permit the interest earned on pooled client trust accounts to be used to fund legal 
                                                 
250,000 cases in 1995 involved housing.  Id. 
8  The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:  
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.    
U.S. Const. amend. VI. (emphasis added); cf. M.L.B. v. S.L.K., 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996).  The 
United States Supreme Court stated “[T]he right to counsel at state expense . . . is less 
encompassing.  A State must provide trial counsel for an indigent defendant charged with a 
felony, but that right does not extend to nonfelony trials if no term of imprisonment is actually 
imposed.”   Id. at 562 (1996) (citations omitted). 
9  See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 899-901 (13th ed. 
1997).  While a State may not be required to provide an attorney for a civil litigant, it may not 
always deny access to its courts to a civil litigant solely on his or her inability to pay litigation 
costs.  See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996) (holding that a state may not deny 
access to courts, solely on a parties inability to pay, in parental termination cases); Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (holding that a state cannot deny, solely on a parties inability 
to pay, access to its courts for individuals seeking to terminate their marriage); Little v. 
Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (holding that an indigent defendant in a paternity action is entitled 
to state sponsored blood grouping tests).  But cf. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) 
(upholding fifty dollar filing fee in a voluntary bankruptcy proceeding); Orstein v. Schwab, 
410 U.S. 656 (1973) (upholding twenty-five dollar fee for a review of a denial of welfare 
benefits). 
10  “Pro se” can be defined as “[f]or one’s own behalf; in person.  Appearing for oneself, 
as in the case of one who does not retain a lawyer and appears for himself in court.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (6th ed. 1990). 
11  Former Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Edward Hennessey 
explains “As a former judge, I saw firsthand the effects of the legal services shortages.  
Litigants who come to court pro se . . . are at a significant disadvantage in the courtroom, and 
it is extremely difficult for the judge in these cases to ensure that justice is served.”  
Hennessey, supra  note 3, at A15.  Another possibility is “pro bono” representation.  “Pro 
bono” can be defined as “[f]or the good; used to describe work or services (e.g. legal 
services) done or performed free of charge.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (6th ed. 1990).  
The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct states that “[a] lawyer 
should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico services per year.”  MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1997) (emphasis added). 
12  See, e.g., IOLTA May Be Invalid, supra note 1, at 2. 
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services for the financially disadvantaged.13  Since their inception, IOLTAs have been 
highly controversial and under constitutional attack.14  These attacks have been largely 
unsuccessful,15 until a recent United States Supreme Court decision placed the 
constitutionality of IOLTA programs in serious doubt.16 
 
This comment seeks to outline the history of IOLTA, it’s  current status, and it’s 
probable future in light of recent court decisions.  First, the comment considers the 
history of IOLTA programs in both the United States and in Ohio.17  Second, it 
examines the primary types of constitutional challenges endured by IOLTA programs.18 
 Third, this comment focuses on the unlikely continued viability of IOLTA programs, in 
light of recent court decisions.19  Finally, this comment concludes with the proposition 
that mandatory IOLTA programs are on the verge of being declared unconstitutional 
and that states will need to consider alternative sources of money to fill the funding void 
left in the wake of IOLTA’s apparent demise.20 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
A.  Origination of IOLTA in the United States 
 
While IOLTAs are relatively new in the United States, the concept has been widely 
implemented around the world.21  In considering the history of IOLTA in the United 
States, one must first consider the underlying need for such a program.  Both the 
                    
13  Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 118 S. Ct. 1925, 1928 (1998).  However, this is not 
the only worthwhile cause funded by IOLTA programs.  See Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 819 
F.2d 1002, 1004 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating that funds from Florida’s IOTA program were used to 
fund law student scholarships). 
14  See generally Kevin H. Douglas, Note, IOLTAS Unmasked: Legal Aid Programs’ 
Funding Results in Taking of Client’s Property, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1297, 1333 (1997) (accusing 
IOLTA programs of “quietly confiscating property from a dispersed political minority”).   
15  See, e.g., Washington Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1993); 
Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1987); In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 
356 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1978). 
16   See Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1925 (holding that under Texas law, interest generated by 
IOLTA accounts constituted private property for the purpose of Takings Clause analysis).  
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “No person . . . shall be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. (emphasis added).     
  
17  Infra Part II.A-B. 
18  Infra Part III.A-B. 
19  Infra Part IV.A-D. 
20  Infra Part V. 
21  As of 1978, interest was being paid on lawyers’ trust accounts in the following 
countries: South Africa, Rhodesia, Australia, and Canada.  In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 
356 So. 2d 799, 803, n.25 (Fla. 1978).  In countries such as South Africa, participation in the 
IOLTA program is optional; while in others such as Australia and Canada, participation is 
mandatory.  Id. at n.27.  In the vast majority of these countries, IOLTA programs have been 
largely successful.  Id. 
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ABA22 Model Code of Professional Responsibility23 and the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct24 prohibit the commingling of a client’s funds with those of an 
attorney.25  As such, attorneys have traditionally set up pooled client trust accounts, in 
which the client’s money is placed for the duration of the representation.26  Prior to 
                    
22  ABA is an acronym for American Bar Association.  The American Bar Association was 
founded in New York in 1878 by over 100 lawyers representing twenty-one states.  See ABA 
Media Relations and Public Affairs, ABA History (visited September 19, 
1998)<http://www.abanet.org/media/overview/phistory.html>. The American Bar 
Association’s stated mission is “to be the national representative of the legal profession, 
serving the public and the profession by promoting justice, professional excellence and 
respect for the law.”  Id.  
23  The Model Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted by the American Bar 
Association in 1969. THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 12 (6th ed. 1995).  The Model Code of Professional Responsibility contains 
both ‘Disciplinary Rules’ and ‘Ethical Considerations.’ Id. Only a violation of a ‘Disciplinary 
Rule’ will subject the violating attorney to discipline, up to disbarment.  Id.  It is important to 
note that neither the Model Code nor the Model Rules are legally binding until adopted by a 
state’s supreme court.  Id.  The Model Code was subsequently adopted by almost every state 
supreme court.  Id.  The Supreme Court of Ohio adopted the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility on October 5, 1970 and continues to use it today. OH. ST. GOVT. BAR RULE 4.  
For a look at conduct in the legal profession prior to the adoption of the Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility, see Vern Countryman, The Scope of Lawyer’s Professional 
Responsibility, 26 OHIO ST. L.J. 66 (1965). 
24  The Model Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted by the American Bar 
Association in 1983.  MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 23, at 12.  The Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct contain both ‘Rules’ and ‘Comments.’  Id.  Violation of a ‘Rule’ may 
subject an attorney to discipline.  Id.  Similarly, the ‘Comments’ are considered to have 
“authoritative status.”  Id.  As of 1995, the Model Rules have been adopted in over thirty-five 
states.  Id.   
25  MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102 (1983).  The Rule states: 
(A) All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, other than advances for costs 
and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable bank accounts 
maintained in the state in which the law office is situated and no funds belonging to 
the lawyer or law firm shall be deposited therein . . . .   
Id.  For a look at how the rule has been applied in Ohio, see Columbus Bar Ass’n. v. Kostelac, 
687 N.E.2d 408 (Ohio 1997) (holding that an attorney is subject to discipline for commingling 
his client’s funds with his own, even where the client is not prejudiced); Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Shaw, 472 N.E.2d 1075 (Ohio 1984) (stating that the misappropriation of a client’s 
funds is grounds for indefinite suspension). Similarly, the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct Rule 1.15 states: 
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer’s 
possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s own 
property . . . complete records of such account funds shall be kept by the lawyer and 
shall be preserved for a period of [five years] after termination of the representation. 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15(a) (1983). 
26  Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 118 S. Ct. 1925, 1928 (1998).   This was the 
preferred method of holding client’s funds, especially where the amount being held for an 
individual client was relatively small, due to the administrative inefficiencies and separate 
bank charges associated with maintaining separate accounts for each client.  Id.  Of course, 
when a lawyer held a “large sum in trust for his client, such funds were generally placed in an 
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1982, these types of accounts were non-interest bearing.27  Thus, the main beneficiaries 
of this type of arrangement were the financial institutions where the client’s money was 
deposited.28   
 
In 1982, Congress passed the Consumer Checking Account Equity Act.29  The Act 
permitted interest to be paid on certain types of “available-on-demand” accounts,30 
while restricting ownership in the accounts to a select minority.31  Specifically, the 
statute authorized nonprofit charitable organizations to benefit from such accounts.32  
Thus, a state could circumvent the restrictions by making a nonprofit charitable 
organization the sole recipient of the interest earned on the trust accounts.33 
 
Florida became the first state to take advantage of the change in banking laws by 
implementing an IOTA34 program through judicial decision35 in 1981.36   Other states 
                                                 
interest-bearing savings account because the interest generated outweighed the 
inconvenience caused by the lack of check-writing capabilities.”  Id. 
27  Before 1982, federal law prohibited banks from paying interest on demand accounts. 12 
U.S.C.A § 1464 (West Supp. 1998) (amended 1982).  Specifically, 12 U.S.C.A § 1464(b)(1)(B) 
stated: “[a] Federal savings association may not– (i) pay interest on a demand account.”  Id.  
28  Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1987).  The court stated that the 
banks were “treated to ‘free’ use of trust account deposits.”  Id. at 1005. 
29  12 U.S.C. § 1832 (1987).  Specifically, 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(1) reads: “Notwithstanding 
any other provisions of law but subject to paragraph (2), a depositary institution is authorized 
to permit the owner of a deposit or account on which interest or dividends are paid to make 
withdrawals by negotiable or transferable instruments for the purpose of making transfers to 
third parties.”  Id. 
30  These accounts are also known as Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (NOW) accounts. 
See Cone, 819 F.2d at 1005. 
31  See 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(2) (1987) stating: 
Paragraph (1) shall apply only with respect to deposits or accounts which consist 
solely of funds in which the entire beneficial interest is held by one or more 
individuals or by an organization which is operated primarily for religious, 
philanthropic, charitable, educational, political, or other similar purposes and which 
is not operated for profit . . . .   
Id.  
32  Id. 
33  Cone, 819 F.2d at 1006.  In Cone, the State of Florida had set up a system where the 
Florida Bar Foundation was the sole recipient of all interest earned on lawyer trust accounts.  
Id. at 1004.  The Foundation would then “allot the funds to legal aid organizations, law 
student scholarships, and other charitable purposes.”  Id.   
34  IOTA and IOLTA are in essence interchangeable.  IOTA is an acronym for Interest on 
Trust Accounts.  For ease of reading, the acronym IOLTA will be used throughout this 
comment. 
35  In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 396 (Fla. 1981). 
36  Note that the act authorizing such action, the Consumer Checking Account Equity Act, 
did not become law until 1982.  12 U.S.C. § 1832 (1982).   Even though Florida did not establish 
an IOLTA program until 1981, the concept had been considered by the State of Florida as 
early as 1971. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d at 800.  For an interesting 
discussion on how the Internal Revenue Service helped shape the way the nation’s first 
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soon followed suit,37 some by judicial decision38 and others through legislative 
enactment.39  Additionally, some states have chosen to make participation in IOLTA 
programs mandatory,40 while others have made participation optional.41  Currently, all 
fifty states and the District of Columbia have some form of IOLTA program.42 
 
B. The Birth of IOLTA in Ohio  
                                                 
IOLTA program was implemented, see Kristin A. Dulong, Note, Exploring the Fifth 
Dimension: IOLTA, Professional Responsibility, and the Takings Clause, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 91 (1997).   
37  Other states that implemented early IOLTA programs include Minnesota, New 
Hampshire, Utah, Arkansas, Massachusetts, and California.  Cone, 819 F.2d at 1006. 
38  Whether a state will implement an IOLTA program through judicial decision or 
legislative enactment depends upon “which government branch the state constitution holds 
responsible for regulating the state’s legal profession.” Terence E. Doherty, The 
Constitutionality of IOLTA Accounts, 19 WHITTIER L. REV. 487, 490 (1998). 
39  California and Maryland are examples of states which have adopted  IOLTA programs 
through legislative enactment.  For more information on these programs, see Betsy Borden 
Johnson, Comment, ‘With Liberty and Justice For All’ IOLTA in Texas - The Texas Equal 
Access to Justice System, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 725 (1985). 
In contrast, Texas serves as an example of a state that was forced to create a voluntary 
IOLTA program through judicial decision after an attempt to create a mandatory program 
failed in the legislature. See Elrich, supra note 5, at 895 (citing In re Interest on Trust 
Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 396 (Fla. 1981)).  In December of 1981, the Texas Bar created a 
committee to study the feasibility of implementing an IOLTA program.  Id. (citing Johnson, 
supra , at 736).  The committee recommended establishing a mandatory IOLTA program and, 
in 1983, the Texas Bar subsequently drafted legislation that was presented to the Texas 
legislature.  Id.  The proposed statute failed in the legislature and the Texas Bar was forced to 
settle for a voluntary IOLTA program later adopted by the Texas Supreme Court.  Id.  
40  Currently, twenty-six states have mandatory IOLTA programs. Brennan J. Torregrossa, 
Note, Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation: Is there 
an IOTA of Property Interest in IOLTA?, 42 VILL. L. REV. 189, 192 (1997).  Examples of states 
that have made participation in an IOLTA program mandatory include: Arizona, California, 
Iowa, Minnesota, Washington and Wisconsin.  Phillip F. Downey, Comment, Attorney’s Trust 
Accounts: The Bar’s Role in the Preservation of Client Property, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 275, n.32 
(1988) (citation omitted).  Participation in Ohio’s IOLTA program is also mandatory.  See infra 
Part II.B.  
41  The first IOLTA program in the country was optional.  Elrich, supra  note 5, at 894.  In 
1988, because of the success in generating interest experienced by IOLTA programs in 
“mandatory” IOLTA states, the American Bar Association recommended that all states 
convert to a mandatory program.  Doherty, supra note 38, at 491.  Currently, twenty-four 
states have some form of optional IOLTA program.  Id.  For more information on the 
differences between mandatory and voluntary IOLTA programs, see generally Torregrossa, 
supra  note 40. 
42  Indiana was the last state to implement an IOLTA program.  David J. Remondini, IOLTA 
Arrives in Indiana: Trial Judges To Play Key Role In Pro Bono Plan, 41 RES GESTAE 9 
(Indiana Bar Association, Feb. 1998).  Indiana’s voluntary IOLTA program was formally 
adopted by the Indiana Supreme Court on October 22, 1997.  Id.  For more on the history of 
IOLTA programs in the United States, see generally Dulong, supra  note 36; Douglas, supra 
note 14.  
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Ohio first considered the idea of establishing an Interest on Lawyer’s Trust Account 
program in the early 1980’s.43  It appears that Ohio’s initial consideration of IOLTA 
was precipitated by two factors.  First, recent changes in the nation’s banking laws 
made it permissible to establish interest bearing “available on demand accounts.”44  For 
the first time, the payment of interest was permitted on certain types of “available-on-
demand” accounts,45 if they were held by a particular type of individual or 
organization.46  The second precipitating factor was that other states47 had implemented 
similar programs and were utilizing the earned interest to fund legal services for the 
disadvantaged.48   
 
Combined, these factors prompted the Ohio State Bar Association49 to form a 
committee to study the feasibility of an IOLTA program.50  In 1983, a majority of the 
committee51 not only recommended that a mandatory IOLTA program be established,52 
                    
43  Walter M. Lawson, Condensed Report of the Committee to Study Interest on Lawyers 
Trust Accounts (IOLTA) , 56 OHIO ST. B. ASS’N. REP. 1510, 1510 (1983). 
44  12 U.S.C. § 1832 (1987).  For a discussion of these code provisions, see supra notes 29-
31 and accompanying text. 
45  12 U.S.C. § 1832.  
46  Id. at (a)(2).  
47  When Ohio was first considering establishing an IOLTA program, fifteen states had 
already implemented some form of IOLTA, and two states had rejected the concept. Lawson, 
supra note 43, at 1514.  Georgia and West Virginia were the two states who initially rejected 
the IOLTA concept. Id.  However, by the time the Ohio State Bar Association recommended 
the implementation of IOLTA, both states had begun to reconsider the program.  Id.  
48  See, e.g., Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 118 S. Ct. 1925, 1928 (1998); Cone v. 
State Bar of Florida, 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1987). 
49  The Ohio State Bar Association was founded in 1880. OSBA Public Relations, Info on 
OSBA (visited October 2, 1998)<http://www.ohiobar.org /info/index _right.html>.  It is a 
voluntary professional organization comprised of nearly seventy-five percent of Ohio’s 
lawyers and judges.  Id. 
50  The Committee to Study Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts was formed in 1982 by 
the Ohio State Bar Association. Lawson, supra note 43, at 1514.  As the name states, the 
report is the condensed version of the full report issued by the committee.  Id.  For a copy of 
the full report, contact the Ohio State Bar Association, 33 W. 11th Avenue, Columbus, Ohio 
43201. 
51  The final vote on the committee’s recommendation to implement a mandatory IOLTA 
program in Ohio was eleven to one.  Lawson, supra  note 43, at 1535.  The lone dissenter, Mr. 
Keith McNamara, not only felt that a mandatory IOLTA would unduly burden the state’s 
financial institutions, but he also viewed IOLTA as unethical and unconstitutional.  Id.  Mr. 
McNamara’s argument that IOLTA’s would be unduly burdensome on Ohio’s financial 
institutions was grounded in the fact that banks did not at the time have the software required 
to manage the numerous IOLTA accounts that would be required under a mandatory 
program.  Id. at 1539.  McNamara also viewed the manual administration of such accounts to 
be cost prohibitive.  Id.  On constitutional grounds, a debate was raging across the nation 
concerning whether or not a client had a property interest in the interest being earned on 
money being held in an IOLTA.  Id. at 1536-37.  McNamara found the argument that the client 
has no property interest in these monies to be illogical and unfounded in law.  Id. at 1537.    
7
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but they also devised a basic framework of how to structure the IOLTA. 53  One of the 
key provisions in the proposed IOLTA structure stated that “IOLTA accounts are 
reserved exclusively for deposits that are either nominal in amount or are to be held for 
only a short time, or both.”54  
 
Ohio’s IOLTA program was officially established by legislative enactment in 1985.55 
 Key provisions in the Ohio State Bar Association’s report56 were incorporated into the 
statute.  For instance, the statute mandated that attorneys who accept clients’ funds in 
trust that are nominal in nature57 or to be held for a short duration,58 must place the 
funds in an IOLTA account.59  The statute further mandates that interest earned on 
these accounts be deposited into a legal aid fund60 by the Treasurer of the State of 
                                                 
52  Lawson, supra note 43, at 1524.  One of the main reasons the committee determined 
IOLTA worthy of implementation in Ohio was the fact that it was estimated that such a 
program would generate an estimated net annual income of  three million dollars.  Id. at 1510.  
In discussing why the committee chose to recommend that participation in the program be 
mandatory, the committee stated: 
The Committee chose to recommend a mandatory plan in order to obtain maximum 
yield for the projects and programs to benefit from it.  At the same time, the 
Committee was careful to carve out exceptions for smaller accounts in which interest 
earned would be unlikely to cover service charges, and when suitable interest-
bearing accounts are not available. 
Id. at 1524. 
53  Specifically, the Committee recommended that the IOLTA program be structured to 
“[t]ake into account ethical considerations and the practical aspects of maintaining trust 
accounts; to meet possible constitutional objections; to avoid unfavorable tax treatment; to 
provide a broad range of projects and programs to benefit from the plan; and to . . . make the 
plan acceptable to the general bar and public.”  Id. at 1510. 
54  Lawson, supra note 43, at 1525.  This provision is essentially codified in OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 4705.09(A)(2)(a) (Banks-Baldwin 1998); see infra  note 59.  “What constitutes 
‘nominal’ or ‘short-term’ is left to the attorney’s sound judgement, with the provision that 
charges of misconduct cannot be predicated on the exercise of such judgement.”  Lawson, 
supra  note 43, at 1525.  However, the Committee inferred that deposits of one thousand 
dollars or less for periods of thirty days or less would satisfy both the nominal and short-term 
requirements.  Id. 
55  OHIO REV. CODE § 4705.09 (Banks-Baldwin 1998) (amended 1984, effective 1985). 
56  See Lawson, supra note 43, at 1525. 
57  Funds that are more than nominal in nature are exempt from the requirements of § 
4705.09; see supra  note 52. 
58  Lawson, supra note 43, at 1525.  For a discussion of what constitutes a short duration, 
see supra  note 54. 
59  § 4705.09(A)(2)(a).  The statute states in pertinent part: “Each attorney who receives 
funds belonging to a client shall . . . deposit all client funds held that are nominal in amount or 
are to be held by the attorney for a short period of time.”  Id.  Additionally, the statute 
requires that “each account established . . . shall be in the name of the attorney, firm, or 
association that established or is maintaining it and shall be identified as an IOLTA or an 
interest on lawyer’s trust account.”  § 4705.09(A)(1). 
60  Id.  For a look at how the legal aid fund was established, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
120.52 (Banks-Baldwin 1995). 
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Ohio.61  Legal aid funds are in turn used to fund legal aid societies.62  
 
The legislature also provided for the Ohio Supreme Court to have the power to adopt 
and enforce rules pertaining to the use and enforcement of IOLTAs.63  For the most 
part, the Ohio statute64 has remained unchanged in the fourteen years since its 
inception.65        
 
III. HISTORICAL CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACKS ON IOLTA 
 
Almost as quickly as IOLTA programs were being established around the country,66 
they were being challenged.67  Historically, IOLTA programs have been challenged on 
                    
61  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4705.09(B).  The statute states in pertinent part: 
All interest earned on funds deposited in an interest-bearing trust account . . . shall 
be transmitted to the treasurer of state . . . No part of the interest earned on funds 
deposited in an interest-bearing trust account . . . shall be paid to, or inure to the 
benefit of, the attorney, the attorney’s law firm or legal professional association, the 
client or other person who owns or has a beneficial ownership of the funds 
deposited, or any other person other than in accordance with this section, section 
4705.10, and sections 120.51 to 120.55 of the Revised Code.   
Id.  Section 4705.10 pertains to the administration of IOLTAs.  Sections 120.51 to 120.55 of the 
Ohio Revised Code pertain to legal aid funds. 
62  A Legal Aid Society is a: 
[N]onprofit corporation that satisfies all of the following: 
(1) It is  chartered to provide general legal services to the poor, it is incorporated 
and operated exclusively in this state, its primary purpose or function is to provide 
civil legal services, without charge, to indigents, and in addition to providing civil 
legal services to indigents, it may provide legal training or legal technical assistance 
to other legal aid societies in this state. 
(2) It has a board of trustees, a majority of its board of trustees are attorneys, and 
at least one-third of its board of trustees, when selected, are eligible to receive legal 
services from the legal aid society. 
(3) it receives funding from the legal services corporation or otherwise provides 
civil legal services to indigents. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 120.51(A)(1)-(3) (Banks-Baldwin 1998).  For a better understanding 
of what the term “indigent” means under the statute, see supra  note 4.  For more information 
on the Legal Services Corporation, see supra note 5. 
63  See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4705.09(D).  The Ohio State Supreme Court als o governs 
the conduct of attorneys generally.  See generally OHIO GOV’T BAR RULES 4-5 (Banks-Baldwin 
1998) (establishing a Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme 
Court); Stanley A. Samad, Ohio Revised Rules for the Government of the Judiciary and the 
Bar: A Critique, 13 CAP. U. L. REV. 25 (1983). 
64  § 4705.09. 
65  Minor textual revisions were made in a 1995 amendment. 
66  Florida established the first IOLTA program in 1981.  In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 
402 So. 2d 389, 389 (Fla. 1981).  By 1983, fifteen states had adopted some form of an IOLTA 
program.  See Lawson, supra note 43, at 1514. 
67  See W. Frank Newton and James W. Paulson, Constitutional Challenges to IOLTA 
Revisited, 101 DICK. L. REV. 549 (1997) (summarizing some constitutional challenges to IOLTA 
programs); see, e.g., In re Minnesota State Bar Ass’n, 332 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. 1982); In re New 
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two different constitutional grounds, namely under the First and Fifth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution.  These challenges will be examined individually. 
 
A. IOLTA and the First Amendment       
In the past, IOLTA programs have been challenged as  unconstitutional on the basis 
that they violate the First Amendment68 to the United States Constitution.69   
 
Challenges to IOLTA programs on First Amendment grounds can be segregated into 
two distinct groupings.  The first involves First Amendment challenges to “voluntary”70 
IOLTA programs.  Such challenges are virtually nonexistent.71   
 
First Amendment72 challenges to IOLTA programs that compel73 participation 
constitute the second grouping.74  Namely, the challengers75 have asserted that the 
states’ use of interest earned on IOLTAs forces them to support ideological or political 
                                                 
Hampshire Bar Ass’n, 453 A.2d 1258 (N.H. 1982); In re Interest on Lawyer’s Trust Accounts, 
672 P.2d 406 (Utah 1983); In re Interest on Lawyer’s Trust Accounts, 675 S.W.2d 355 (Ark. 
1984); In re Massachusetts Bar Ass’n, 478 N.E.2d 715 (Mass. 1985); Caroll v. State Bar of Cal., 
213 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1985); Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1987). 
68  The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
The First Amendment is made applicable to the several states by incorporation.  See, e.g., 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
69  See, e.g., Washington Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1993); 
Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Access to Justice Found., 94 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1996), aff’d 
in part by Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 118 S. Ct. 1925 (1998). 
70  States that have a “voluntary” IOLTA program usually permit the attorney to choose 
whether or not to participate in the program, whereas the client has little, if any, choice in the 
matter.  Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Access to Justice Found. 94 F.3d 996, 998 (5th Cir. 
1996). 
71  This  is due to the fact that the First Amendment argument is premised on the 
proposition that participants are being forced to fund legal services they find to be offensive. 
 See Washington Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 976 (1st Cir. 1993).  
However, if participation in an IOLTA program is voluntary, one can hardly claim that they 
are being forced.  But see Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Access to Justice Found., 94 
F.3d 996, 998 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that states with voluntary IOLTA programs usually leave 
the question of whether to participate in an IOLTA for the attorney). 
72  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
73  States that have a “mandatory” IOLTA program mandate attorney participation.  See, 
e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4705.09(A)(2)(a); see also  Torregrossa, supra  note 40, at 192. 
74  See Washington Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 977 (1st Cir. 1993). 
75  Challengers include organizations such as the Washington Legal Foundation.  
Washington Legal, 993 F.2d at 962.  The Washington Legal Foundation is a national, non-
profit, tax-exempt public foundation.  Washington Legal Foundation’s - How to Support, 
<http:www.wlf.org/howtosup.htm>.  Founded in 1977, the Washington Legal Foundation’s 
only goal is “to defend and promote the principles of free enterprise and individual rights.”  
Washington Legal Foundation’s Missions and Goal, <http:www.wlf.org/mission.htm>.  
10
Akron Law Review, Vol. 32 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol32/iss2/3
1999] THE FUTURE OF IOLTA 
organizations they find to be offensive and in violation of both the right to free speech 
and the right to freedom of association under the First Amendment.76  In essence, the 
argument proceeds that IOLTAs compel speech by requiring the client to financially 
support views to which the client is diametrically opposed.  In the past, the United 
States Supreme Court has ruled that compelling financial support for private 
organizations “implicates First Amendment rights when the funds were used to 
subsidize ideological or political activities.”77  Despite this, First Amendment challenges 
to IOLTA programs have been largely unsuccessful.78  
 
In Washington Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts Bar  Foundation,79 appellants in 
a mandatory IOLTA program80 claimed that their compelled participation81 in the 
funding of ideological and political activities82 violated their First Amendment83 rights to 
freedom of speech and freedom of association.84   
 
The district court granted the Massachusetts Bar Foundation’s motion to dismiss.85  
                    
76  See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
77  Washington Legal, 993 F.2d at 977 (citing Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990)); 
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991); AFL-CIO v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986); 
Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); 
Railway Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963). 
78  See, e.g., Washington Legal, 993 F.2d 962 (involving a First Amendment challenge to 
Massachusetts “mandatory” IOLTA program); Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Access to 
Justice Found., 94 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1996) (involving a First Amendment challenge to the 
Texas’ “mandatory” IOLTA program).  But cf. Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 118 S. Ct. 
1925 (1998) (finding a property interest in interest earned by IOLTAs).  For more information 
on the Court’s decision in Phillips, see infra Part IV.B. 
79  993 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1993).  
80  Massachusetts’ IOLTA program was established in 1985.  Id. at 968.   Participation in 
the program remained voluntary from 1985 to 1990.  Id.  At the end of 1989, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court converted the voluntary IOLTA program into a 
mandatory program, effective January 1, 1990.   Id. 
81  Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that interest being earned on their money, while held 
in trust, was being used to fund ideological and political causes they found to be offensive.  
Id. at 970.  The client alleged that she was being forced to “choose between employing an 
attorney or financially supporting organizations with which she disagrees.”  Id.  However, 
one cannot escape the thought that the client had a third alternative; that of depositing a 
large enough sum of money with the attorney to justify opening a separate interest bearing 
account solely for the benefit of that client.  This, of course, presupposes the fact that any 
unused portion of the retainer would be refundable. 
82  At the time of this case, sixty-seven percent of all interest collected from IOLTAs in 
Massachusetts was being channeled to Massachusetts Legal Assistance.  Id. at 969.  The 
remaining money was being delegated to “other designated charitable entities.”  Id. 
83  Washington Legal Foundation also claimed that Massachusetts’ mandatory IOLTA 
program violated the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution by effecting a taking 
of the client’s property without just compensation.  Id. at 970.  For more information on this 
portion of the opinion, see infra Part III.B.- IV. 
84  Washington Legal, 993 F.2d at 970. 
85  Washington Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 795 F.Supp. 50 (D. Mass. 1992). 
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The United States First Circuit Court of Appeals stated that analyzing appellant’s First 
Amendment argument requires a two step process.86  First, the court must determine 
whether Massachusetts’ mandatory IOLTA program “burdens protected speech by 
forcing expression through compelled support of organizations espousing ideologies or 
engaging in political activities.”87  Second, if the court finds the speech to be burdened, 
the court will then strictly scrutinize88 the Massachusetts IOLTA program to determine 
whether it served a compelling state interest in a narrowly tailored fashion.89 
 
In applying the first part of the test, the court held that Massachusetts mandatory 
IOLTA program did not compel90 appellant’s speech.91  While the court recognized that 
the interest earned on IOLTAs in Massachusetts was being used to fund activities 
which may be contrary to appellant’s beliefs, the court reasoned that the earned interest 
was not the client’s property, and therefore, it was not the client who was supporting 
the activities.92   
 
                    
86  Washington Legal, 993 F.2d at 977.  
87  Id. 
88  The test of ‘strict scrutiny,’ used in many “content-based” freedom of speech cases, is 
an exacting standard that requires a state to prove that its burden on speech is narrowly 
tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.  See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members 
of New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991); Carol M. Grieb, “Son of Sam” Laws - 
A Content Based Financially Burdensome Speech Restriction That Is Not Narrowly 
Tailored to Achieve a Compelling State Interest is Inconsistent with the First Amendment, 
31 DUQ. L. REV. 401 (1993).  Burdens on speech subject to the Court’s strict scrutiny analysis 
rarely survive.  For a case where a state law survived strict scrutiny analysis, see Burson v. 
Freeman, 504 U.S. 1919 (1971) (stating that ”[i]t is the rare case in which we have held that a 
law survives strict scrutiny.  This, however, is such a case.”).  Burson involved a challenge to 
a Tennessee law creating an “election-day ‘campaign-free zone’ ” which was “designed to 
protect potential voters from intimidation and to conduct elections with integrity and 
reliability.”  Id.; see Kenneth P. Kayal, Note, State Statute Prohibiting the Solicitation of 
Votes and the Display or Distribution of Campaign Materials Within 100 Feet of Polling 
Place Constitutes a Valid Content-Based Restriction on Protected Speech - Burson v. 
Freeman, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 525 (1993). 
89  Washington Legal, 993 F.2d at 977. 
90  For more on the “Compelled Speech Doctrine,” see Kari Thoe, Note, A Learning 
Experience: Discovering the Balance Between Fees-Funded Public Fora and Compelled-
Speech Rights at American Universities, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1425 (1998); David W. Ogden, Is 
There a First Amendment “Right to Remain Silent”? - The Supreme Court’s “Compelled 
Speech” Doctrine, 40 FED. B. NEWS & J. 368 (1993).  
91  Washington Legal, 993 F.2d at 980.  Having found that the mandatory Massachusetts 
IOLTA program does not burden speech, the court did not see the need to reach the second 
step of the analysis.  Id.  
92  Id.  The court in essence merged Washington Legal Foundation’s First and Fifth 
Amendment challenges to Massachusetts’ IOLTA program.  The appellants did not have a 
property interest in the “beneficial use” of the earned interest, negating the Fifth Amendment 
argument, so they could not plausibly state that they were being compelled to support 
ideological or political activities contrary to their beliefs; which negates the First Amendment 
argument.  For more on Fifth Amendment challenges to IOLTAs, see infra Part III.B. 
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Similarly, in Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Access to Justice Foundation,93 
appellants claimed that their compelled participation in the Texas IOLTA program94 
forced them to support speech they found to be offensive,95 and it violated their First 
Amendment right to freedom of speech.96 
 
The district court granted the Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation’s motion 
for summary judgment ruling that clients do not have a property interest in funds 
generated by their trust accounts and that mandatory participation in the IOLTA 
program did not constitute financial support by the plaintiffs of the recipient 
organization.97  The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the district 
court’s ruling, finding that clients do have a property interest in funds generated by their 
trust accounts.98  However, the appellate court did not address the issue whether 
compelled participation in the Texas mandatory IOLTA program constitutes financial 
support by the plaintiffs of the recipient organizations.  
 
While the Fifth Circuit did not rule specifically on the plaintiff’s First Amendment 
claim, it did open the door by rejecting the prevailing view99 that interest earned on 
IOLTAs was not the property of the client.100   
                    
93  94 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1996) (Texas Equal Access), aff’d in part by Phillips v. Washington 
Legal Found., 118 S. Ct. 1925 (1998). 
94  The Texas IOLTA program was established in 1984.  Id. at 998.   Participation in the 
Texas program was voluntary until 1988, when the Texas Supreme Court mandated 
participation.  Id. at 999.  Prior to the switch, the Texas IOLTA program generated 
approximately one million dollars per year, which was in turn distributed to various non-profit 
organizations.  Id.  After the switch to mandatory participation, Texas saw a dramatic increase 
in IOLTA revenue.  Id.  As of 1995, Texas IOLTA programs were generating nearly ten million 
dollars a year.  Id.  
95  Specifically, the plaintiffs objected to the portion of IOLTA funds that went to groups 
“providing aid services to refugees seeking political asylum in the United States and those 
organizations assisting death row inmates to challenge their death sentences.”  Texas Equal 
Access, 94 F.3d at 999. 
96  Id.  Washington Legal Foundation also claimed that the Texas’ mandatory IOLTA 
program violated the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Id.  For more 
information on this portion of the opinion, see infra Part III.B; infra Part IV. 
97  Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 873 F. Supp. 1 
(W.D. Tex. 1995), rev’d in part by Texas Equal Access, 94 F.3d 996. 
98  Texas Equal Access, 94 F.3d at 996.  This portion of the district court’s holding was not 
only vacated by the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, it has also been rejected by the United States 
Supreme Court.  See Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 118 S. Ct. 1925 (1998).  For more on 
the Phillip’s decision, see infra Part IV.B and Elrich, supra  note 5, at 897 (providing an 
overview of the Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Access to Justice Foundation 
decision). 
99  See, e.g. Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 
1993); Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1987).  For a look at an early 
decision holding that a client has a property interest in IOLTA generated interest, see In re 
Indiana State Bar Ass’ns Petition, 550 N.E.2d 311 (Ind. 1990) (per curiam).  
100  Texas Equal Access, 94 F.3d at 1005.  For more on this point, see infra Parts III.B and 
IV.A-B. 
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B.  IOLTA and the Fifth Amendment  
 
Traditionally, Fifth Amendment101 challenges to mandatory IOLTA programs have 
been the most common,102 and recently the most damaging.103  The main premise of 
the challengers’ argument is that the interest generated by a client’s money held in trust 
is the property of that client, and any confiscation of that interest by the state without 
just compensation amounts to an impermissible “taking” prohibited by the Fifth 
Amendment.104  Until recently, this argument has been largely unsuccessful. 
 
In Cone v. State Bar of Florida,105 Cone106 claimed that Florida’s IOLTA 
program107 constituted a ‘taking’ of her property without just compensation as 
prohibited by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.108  In making her 
argument, Cone heavily relied on Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,109 
                    
101  The Fifth Amendment to the Unites States Constitution reads in pertinent part: “No 
person . . . shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
(emphasis added).  The Fifth Amendment is made applicable to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).  
102  See, e.g., Texas Equal Access, 94 F.3d 996; Washington Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar 
Found., 993 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1993); Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1987). 
103  See Texas Equal Access, 94 F.3d at 999. 
104  A “taking” is impermissible if “just compensation” is not provided.  See U.S. CONST. 
amend. V.  In the past, courts have been slow to recognize even a property interest on the 
part of the client in the IOLTA generated interest.  See, e.g., Washington Legal, 993 F.2d at 
962 (holding that a client does not possess a property interest in IOLTA generated interest); 
Cone, 819 F.2d at 1002 (holding that a client does not possess a property interest in IOLTA 
generated interest); see also id. at 1006 n.5 (listing various state supreme courts that have 
also failed to find a property interest on the part of the client in IOLTA generated interest).  
Therefore, most courts have not reached the “impermissible taking” issue.  Cf. Washington 
Legal, 993 F.2d at 962 (stating arguendo the court’s analysis of the “taking” issue). 
105  819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1987).  
106  The suit was initially brought by Ms. Glaeser, who died while the appeal from the 
lower court’s dismissal was pending.  Id. at 1004.  Ms. Jean Cone was the personal 
representative of Ms. Glaeser’s estate.  Id. 
107  Florida was the first state to implement an IOLTA program.  In re Interest on Trust 
Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 396 (Fla. 1981). 
108  Cone, 819 F.2d at 1004.  Specifically, Cone claimed that the interest earned on her 
money while held in trust in the IOLTA was her property.  Id.  Consequently, Cone claimed 
that the seizure of that property by the State Bar without just compensation constituted an 
impermissible taking.  Id.   Remarkably, the controversy in Cone arose over the two dollar and 
twenty-five cents worth of interest generated by a principal of thirteen dollars and seventy-
five cents held in an IOLTA.  Id. at 1002.  
109  449 U.S. 155 (1980).  In Webb’s, the United States Supreme Court struck down a Florida 
law declaring interest earned on interpleader funds to be the property of the court clerk.  Id. at 
164-65. The Court relied on the general property rule that ‘interest follows principal’ to hold 
that the retention of the interest earned on the interpleader funds constituted an 
impermissible taking.  Id.  
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and the traditional property doctrine that “interest follows principal.”110  However, the 
United States Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted that without Florida’s IOLTA 
program, no interest would have been generated for the benefit of Cone or anyone 
else.111  Therefore, the operation of Florida’s IOLTA could not be said to deprive Cone 
of a property interest.112  The court further distinguished Webb’s from the case at bar 
by stating that the crucial distinction is in the circumstances that create “a legitimate 
expectation of interest exclusive of administrative costs and expenses.”113  The court 
stated that the $90,000 in interest involved in Webb’s created the necessary expectation, 
whereas the $2.25 of earned interest involved in Cone did not.114   
 
Similarly, in Washington Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts Bar Foundation,115 the 
Foundation claimed that the Massachusetts IOLTA program116 constituted a ‘taking’ of 
a client’s property without just compensation as prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.117 
Realizing that many courts have been slow to recognize a property interest in IOLTA 
generated interest,118 the Foundation did not claim a property interest in the interest 
itself, but rather in the “beneficial use of the deposited funds, and more specifically, the 
right to control and to exclude others from the beneficial use of those funds.”119  The 
United States First Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis by stating that it is the 
plaintiff’s burden to first establish that they have a recognized property interest that is 
                    
110  Cone, 819 F.2d at 1004 (citing Himely v. Rose, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 313, 319 (1809)); see 
also Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S. at 155. 
111  Cone, 819 F.2d at 1004. 
112  Id. 
113  Cone, 819 F.2d at 1007.  
114  Cone, 819 F.2d at 1007.  The court stated “We do not wish to imply that the state may 
constitutionally appropriate property so long as the property is very small property.”  Id.  
Regardless, the court in Cone felt that the $90,000 dollar in interest at issue in Webb was 
sufficient to warrant protection, while the $2.25 in Cone was not.  The court stated “The 
district court concluded as a matter of law that the use of . . . [Cone’s] money had no net 
value, therefore there could be no property interest for the state to appropriate.  We agree.”  
Id.  The district court had reasoned that the $2.25 generated in interest would not have been 
enough to offset the administrative charges associated with placing Cone’s funds in an 
individual interest bearing account.  Id.  But see Kenneth Paul Kreider, Note, Florida’s IOLTA 
Program does Not “Take” Client Property For Public Use: Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 57 
U. CIN. L. REV. 369, 370 (1988) (suggesting that the line of reasoning used by the court in 
Cone would be “subject to re-examining by later courts”).  
115  993 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1993). 
116  For more on the Massachusetts IOLTA program, see supra  notes 80-82 and 
accompanying text.  The Washington Legal Foundation also claimed that the Massachusetts 
IOLTA program violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech.  See supra  Part 
III.A. 
117  See U.S. CONST. amend. V.  For the pertinent text of the Fifth Amendment, see supra 
note 101. 
118  See Washington Legal, 993 F.2d at 973 (citing five cases where courts have refused to 
recognize a client’s property interest in interest earned on an IOLTA). 
119  Id. 
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capable of being protected under the Fifth Amendment.120  Here, the Foundation 
asserted that a client’s right to control the beneficial use of the IOLTA generated 
interest is a protected property interest based in trust law.121  The Foundation asserted 
that because the phrase “Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts” contained the word 
“trust”, a trust122 is created between the client and the attorney when the client’s money 
is deposited into an IOLTA. 123  The circuit court rejected the Foundation’s trust 
argument, stating that the relationship between attorney and client in Massachusetts is a 
fiduciary relationship as a matter of law.124  Specifically, the circuit court stated “we 
are not convinced that the deposit of client’s funds into IOLTA accounts transforms a 
lawyer’s fiduciary obligation to clients into a formal trust with the reserved right by the 
client to control the beneficial use of the funds.”125  The circuit court similarly rejected 
the Foundation’s claim that a client has a protected property right to exclude others 
from the beneficial use of their property.126  In doing so, the court distinguished the 
recognized right to exclude others from one’s real property,127 from trying to exclude 
others from one’s intangible property.128  The court found no support for the 
proposition that a person has a constitutionally protected right to exclude others from 
intangible property.129  The First Circuit Court’s decision in Washington Legal proved 
to be the high water mark in courts finding IOLTAs constitutionally valid.130   
 
IV.  IOLTA, PRESENT AND FUTURE  
                    
120  Id.  The court noted that not all property interests are protected by the U.S. 
Constitution.  Id.; see also  Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 
(1980) (stating that “a mere unilateral expectation or an abstract need is not a property interest 
entitled to protection”).   
121  Washington Legal, 993 F.2d at 974. 
122  A “trust” is defined as a legal entity created by a grantor for the benefit of designated 
beneficiaries under the laws of the state and the valid trust agreement.  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1221 (6th ed. 1990).  The trustee has a fiduciary duty to manage the trust’s corpus 
assets and income for the economic benefit of all the beneficiaries.  Id. 
123  See Washington Legal, 993 F.2d at 974. 
124  Id. 
125  Id. 
126  Id.  The Foundation was relying exclusively on cases where the United States 
Supreme Court had recognized a property interest in excluding others from the beneficial use 
of real property.  Id.; see, e.g. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 
(1982); infra note 127. 
127  Washington Legal, 993 F.2d at 974; see also  Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 
164 (1979) (holding that the government’s attempt to create a free right to public access to a 
pond constituted a taking); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 
(1982) (holding that a governmentally authorized installation of cable television equipment 
constituted a taking); Robert D. Rubin, Taking Clause v. Technology: Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, A Victory For Tradition, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 165 (1983); 
Catherine R. Connors, Comment, Appalachian Electric Revisited: The Recapture Provision of 
the Federal Power Act After Nollan and Kaiser Aetna, 40 DRAKE L. REV. 533 (1991).   
128  Washington Legal, 993 F.2d at 974. 
129  Id. 
130  See infra  Part IV.A-B. 
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At about the same time the First Circuit131 was joining the Eleventh Circuit132 in 
declaring that a client has no property interest in IOLTA generated interest, a 
controversy over the same issue was brewing in Texas.133  The follow two decisions 
mark the turning of the tide against IOLTAs. 
 
A.  Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Access to Justice Foundation 
 
In Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Access to Justice Foundation,134 the 
Texas IOLTA program was challenged on grounds that it constitutes an impermissible 
‘taking’ of a client’s property without just compensation in dereliction of the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.135 
 
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s 
ruling136 that a client did not have a property interest in IOLTA generated interest.137  
The court of appeals began its analysis by noting that Texas follows the traditional rule 
that “interest follows principal”.138  The court stated that “in light of this rule, it seems 
obvious that the interest earned in the IOLTA accounts is the property of the clients 
whose money is held in those accounts.”139  The court also relied on the reasoning of 
the United States Supreme Court in Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith140 
that “earnings of a fund are incidents of ownership of the fund itself and are property 
just as the fund itself is property.”141  In refusing to follow the lines of reasoning used 
by the First142 and Eleventh Circuits,143 the Fifth Circuit created a split of authority on 
the  constitutionality of mandatory IOLTAs.  Consequently, the respondents in the 
                    
131  Supra  Part III.B (discussing Washington Legal, 993 F.2d 962).  
132  Supra Part III.B (discussing Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1987)). 
133  Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 873 F. Supp. 1 
(W.D. Tex. 1995), rev’d in part by Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice 
Found., 94 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1996). 
134  94 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1996). 
135  Id. at 999. 
136  See Texas Equal Access, 873 F.Supp. at 8.  Specifically, the lower court held that a 
client had neither a property interest in the IOLTA generated interest, nor a protected 
property interest in the “beneficial use” of the IOLTA generated interest.  Id.  In making these 
determinations, the lower court heavily relied on the decisions in Cone and Washington 
Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts Bar Foundation. 
137  Texas Equal Access, 94 F.3d at 996. 
138  The traditional “interest follows principal” rule that the court alluded to stands for the 
proposition that “interest earned on a deposit of principal belongs to the owner of that 
principal.”  Id. at 1000 (citing Sellers v. Harris County, 483 S.W.2d 242, 243 (Tex. 1972)). 
139  Id. 
140  449 U.S. 155 (1980). 
141  Id. at 162-63; see generally Torregrossa, supra  note 40; Douglas, supra  note 14. 
142  See Washington Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1993); see 
supra  Part III.B.  
143  See Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1987); see supra Part III. B. 
17
Hrina: The Future of IOLTA
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1999
 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:2 
Texas Access were granted a writ of certiorari144 by the United States Supreme 
Court.145 
 
B.  Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation 
 
In Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation,146 a sharply divided Court147 affirmed 
the Fifth Circuit Court’s ruling that “the interest income generated by funds held in 
IOLTA accounts is the ‘private property’ of the owner of the principal.”148  The Court 
relied on its prior holding in Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith149 that interest 
follows principal.150  The Court denied petitioner’s arguments that Texas did not follow 
                    
144  “Writ of certiorari” is defined as: 
An order by the . . .  [Supreme Court] which is used by that court . . .  on whether or 
not to hear an appeal from a lower court . . . In the U.S. Supreme Court, a review on 
writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted 
only when there are special and important reasons therefor. 
BLACK’S LAW  DICTIONARY 1609 (6th ed. 1990). 
145  Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 117 S. Ct. 2535 (1997).  The Court limited the writ 
of certiorari to the following question: 
Is interest earned on client trust funds held by lawyers in IOLTA accounts a 
property interest of the client or lawyer, cognizable under the Fifth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution, despite the fundamental precept of IOLTA that such 
funds, absent the IOLTA program, could earn interest for the client or lawyer? 
Petitioner’s Brief at 1, Phillips (No. 96-1578).  At this juncture, the Court declined to consider 
whether the state’s use of the IOLTA generated interest constituted a “taking”, if in fact, the 
Court held the interest to be the property of either the client or the lawyer.  This issue was to 
be decided on remand.  See Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 118 S. Ct. 1925, 1934 (1998) 
(stating “we express no view to whether these funds have been ‘taken’ by the State . . . .  
[W]e leave these issues to be addressed on remand”). 
146  118 S. Ct. 1925 (1998). 
147  The vote was 5-4.  Id. at 1925.  Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the opinion while 
Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer dissented.  Id. at 1927.  The dissent felt that 
the Court’s analysis and holding only partially addressed the “takings” issue.  Id. at 1934 
(Souter, J., dissenting).  Justice Souter stated that “The Court recognizes three distinct issues 
implicated by a takings claim: whether the interest asserted by the plaintiff is property, 
whether the government has taken that property, and whether the plaintiff has been denied 
just compensation for the taking.  The Court is careful to address only the first of these 
questions.”  Id. (citations omitted).  Justice Souter’s approach would be for the Court to 
“determine here whether either of the remaining issues might reasonably be resolved against 
[Phillips]; if so, we should not abstract the property issue for resolution in their now.”  Id. at 
1935-36.   
A separate dissent was authored by Justice Breyer.  Id. at 1937 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
Justice Breyer agreed with Justice Souter that the Court should analyze the three issues 
presented by a “takings” claim collectively.  Id.  However, Justice Breyer also thought the 
majority’s conclusion on the question presented was incorrect.  Id. at 1938.  Justice Breyer 
distinguished the majority’s reliance on Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies and would have held 
that a client does not have a property interest in IOLTA generated interest.  Id. at 1939.  
148  Id. at 1934. 
149  449 U.S. 155 (1980)  
150  Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1931 (stating “at least as to confiscatory regulations, . . . a State 
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the “interest follows principal” rule151 and that client money held in an IOLTA could not 
reasonably be expected to generate interest income.152  The Court further stated that the 
analysis of whether an object is property does not rest on whether it possesses 
economic value.153  The Court reasoned that “while the interest income at issue here 
may have no economically realizable value to its owner, possession, control, and 
disposition are nonetheless valuable rights that inhere in the property”.154  Having 
concluded that a client has a cognizable property interest in IOLTA generated interest, 
the Court remanded the case back to the Fifth Circuit Court to decide the remaining 
issues.155 
 
C.  Do IOLTAs “Take”? 
 
The United States Supreme Court recognizes that a takings claim consists of three 
distinct issues: (1) whether there is a property interest at stake; (2) whether the 
government has taken that property; and (3) whether just compensation is required.156  
Having decided the first of these issues in favor of the Washington Legal Foundation,157 
the Court charged the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals with the task of determining 
whether IOLTA’s “take” property of the client.158   
 
In the past, the United States Supreme Court has stated that analyzing ‘takings’ 
claims does not involve the use of a bright line rule but rather, courts must “engag[e] in 
                                                 
may not sidestep the Takings Clause by disavowing traditional property interest long 
recognized under state law.”). 
151  Petitioner based their argument that Texas does not blindly follow the “interest 
follows principal” rule on several exceptions recognized by Texas law.  Id. at 1931.  One 
exception involved “income-only trusts” and another “marital community property.”  Id.  In 
Texas, neither of these exc eptions utilize the traditional “interest follows principal” rule.  Id.  
The Court distinguished these types of exceptions by noting that both exceptions had a “firm 
basis in traditional property law principles.”  Id.  Whereas there are no similar traditional 
principles of property law that support the proposition that “the owner of a fund temporarily 
deposited in an attorney trust account may be deprived of the interest the fund generates.”  
Id.   
152  Id. at 1932 (citing Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 819 F.2d 1002, 1007 (11th Cir. 1987)).    
153  Id. at 1933.  The Court states “Property is more than economic value, it also consists 
of the group of rights which the so-called owner exercises in his dominion over the physical 
thing, such as the right to possess, use and dispose of it.”  Id. (citing United States v. General 
Motors Corp., 65 U.S. 357, 359 (1945)); see also  Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
154  Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1933; see Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715 (1987) (holding that 
the right to “pass on” property was a valuable right). 
155  Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1934.  The remaining two issues to be decided on remand are 
discussed in detail infra Part IV.C-D. 
156  Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1934. 
157  Id. 
158  Id.  The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits a “taking” 
without “just compensation.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  For an in-depth historical analysis of 
the taking issue, see F. BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKING ISSUE (1973).  The just compensation 
requirement is discussed infra Part IV.D. 
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. . . essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.”159   In conducting these inquiries, the Court 
has articulated several useful factors to aid the courts.160  For the purpose of analyzing 
Fifth Amendment “takings” claims, the Court has stated that the “economic impact of 
the regulation on the claimant,”161 the “extent to which the regulation has interfered 
with distinct investment backed expectations,”162 and “the character of the 
governmental action,”163 are all relevant in determining whether there has been a 
taking.164   
 
Application of the “economic impact of the regulation on the claimant”165 factor, as 
it applies to Phillips,166 seems relatively straight forward.167  Since the Court has 
already determined in Phillips that the client has a property interest in IOLTA generated 
interest,168 any “taking” of that property would surely seem to have an economic 
                    
159  Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see also  David 
Schultz, Scalia, Property, and Dolan v. Tigard: The Emergence of a Post Caroline Products 
Jurisprudence, 29 AKRON L. REV. 1 (1995) (stating that Justice Scalia has voted in favor of the 
property owner eighty-nine percent of the time). 
160  See Washington Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 974 (1st Cir. 1993) 
(citing Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)); see also  Eastern 
Enterprises v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 
211 (1986); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
161  Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225. 
162  Id. 
163  Id.  For more on these three factors and how they have changed since the Court’s 
decision in Penn Central, see David L. Callies, Property Right since Penn Central: 
Regulatory Takings, Investment-Backed Expectations, and Economically Beneficial Use: 
How Perspectives on Property Rights Have Changed From Penn Central to Lucas, SB14 
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 171 (Continuing Legal Education, Oct. 17, 1996), available in Westlaw, SB14 
ALI-ABA 171. 
164  See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.  Penn Central involved a challenge to a city 
ordinance which in effect prohibited the development of private property deemed to be a 
scenic or historic landmark.  Id.  While the Court upheld the regulation, it laid out the factors 
that have governed courts “taking” inquiries for the past twenty years.  Id.; see generally 
Daniel T. Cavarello, Comment, From Penn Central to United Artists’ I & II: The Rise to 
Immunity of Historic Preservation Designation from Successful Takings Challenges, 22 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 593 (1995).   
165  Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986). 
166  Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 118 S. Ct. 1925 (1998). 
167  The dissent in the Phillips case would not so readily agree.  See id. at 1936 (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (maintaining that there has been “no physical occupation or seizure of tangible 
property”).  But see Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2146 (1998) (quoting Penn 
Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)) (stating “although takings 
problems are more commonly presented when ‘the interference with property can be 
characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some 
public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common 
good,’ economic regulations . . . nonetheless effect a taking.”).   
168  Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1934; cf. Washington Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 
F.2d 962, 974 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating in dicta that IOLTAs “cause an illegal ‘taking’ ”).  
However, the First Circuit in Washington Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts Bar 
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impact on the client.169  The only apparent hurdle to this line of reasoning is the 
argument that under current law, interest earned on NOW type accounts cannot be paid 
into a pooled client trust account, albeit for the benefit of a charitable organization.170  
The argument proceeds that the client as an individual can not receive interest on his 
deposit into a pooled client trust account,171 and therefore the subsequent confiscation 
of that interest by the government does not economically impact the client.172  
However, the Court has already held that a client has a property interest in IOLTA 
generated interest.173  Consequently, a line of reasoning that would deny the client the 
economic benefit of that interest, solely on the grounds that a client does not currently 
have access to it,174 appears to be circular.  This outcome appears even more unjust 
when one considers that the client’s participation in the IOLTA program is mandated by 
the very entity seeking to confiscate the interest earned on the client’s principle.  
Further, the fact that the confiscated interest would be used to fund worthwhile public 
concerns175 should not be controlling.  In Armstrong v. U.S.,176 the United States 
Supreme Court stated that the purpose of the Takings Clause is to prevent the 
government “from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”177   
 
Similarly, it would be difficult to assert that a client cannot satisfy the second of the 
Penn Central factors, that of a “distinct investment backed expectation.”178  The United 
                                                 
Foundation based its dicta finding on the proposition that a client does not have a 
recognizable property right in the IOLTA generated interest.  Id. at 975.  A proposition that 
has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Phillips.  See Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 
1934. 
169  See Amanda French Palmer, Comment, A Critique of Interest on Lawyers’ Trust 
Account Programs, 44 LA. L. REV. 999, 1020-21 (1984) (concluding in 1984 that IOLTA’s 
violate the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution);  cf. Dulong, supra  note 36 (concluding 
that IOLTAs are consistent with the Takings Clause); see also Douglas, supra note 14 
(reaching the same conclusion as Palmer, supra, thirteen years later).   
170  See 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(2).  Interest on these types of accounts may only be paid to 
individuals or certain types of exempt organizations.  Id.; supra  notes 29-31 and 
accompanying text. 
171  12 U.S.C. § 1832; see supra  notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
172  See, e.g., Washington Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 976 (1st Cir. 
1993); Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 118 S. Ct. 1925, 1936 (1998) (Souter, J., 
dissenting).    
173  Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1934.   
174  See, e.g., Washington Legal, 993 F.2d at 976; Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1936 (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
175  See supra  notes 2, 7, 13 and accompanying text. 
176  364 U.S. 40 (1960).  For an indepth look at the Court’s decision in Armstrong and it’s 
application to compensation statutes, see William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, 
The Narratives of Takings, and Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1151 (1997). 
177  Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 40. 
178  Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see also  Connolly v. 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986); Chauncey L. Walker and Scott D. 
Avitable, Regulatory Takings, Historic Preservation and Property Rights Since Penn 
Central: The Move Toward Greater Protection, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 819 (1995) 
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States Supreme Court has itself created such an expectation by declaring that a client 
has a property interest in IOLTA generated interest.179  Surely, any client who knows 
that money held in trust is capable of earning interest would expect that the interest be 
paid to him rather than a fund to support political or ideological groups with which he 
may not agree.180  The mere fact that a client may not necessarily consider his deposit 
into an IOLTA an ‘investment’ in the traditional sense of the word,181 cannot be said to 
preclude that same client from expecting to receive the interest once the United States 
Supreme Court has declared it his property.182  
 
The third Penn Central factor calls for a factual inquiry into “the character of the 
governmental action.”183  While in the past the Court has stated that takings problems 
are more commonly presented when “the interference with property can be 
characterized as a physical invasion by government,”184 the Court has also stated that 
“public program[s] adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the 
common good can . . . nonetheless effect a taking.”185 
 
In the case of IOLTAs, the states have attempted to fund legal-aid organizations186 
by siphoning off the interest generated by a client’s money being held in trust.  On 
remand, the Fifth Circuit Court will need to balance competing interests.187  Namely, 
the use of a client’s property to promote the public good versus the apparent injustice 
of requiring “a dispersed political minority”188 to bear, what in all fairness is the public’s 
burden of funding legal service for the disadvantaged.189     
                                                 
(explaining/discussing the evolution of the Penn Central doctrine). 
179  Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 118 S. Ct. 1925, 1934 (1998).   
180  Washington Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1993); see supra 
Part III.A.  
181  This is not to say that a client would not view depositing money into an attorney’s 
trust as an investment. One could always assert that clients retain attorneys with the 
expectation, or at the very least, hope, that they will recover from the defendant more than the 
cost of their representation.  Otherwise, basic principles of economics would dictate that the 
client not pursue his claim. This being the case, any additional returns, such as interest 
earned on a client’s funds while held in trust, are merely an incidental return on the client’s 
“distinct investment backed expectations.”  See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 
U.S. 211, 225 (1986). 
182  See Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1934.    
183  Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
184  Id. 
185  Id. 
186  See supra  notes 2-7 and accompanying text. 
187  Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 118 S. Ct. 1925, 1934 (1998).    
188  See Douglas, supra  note 14, at 1332 (accusing IOLTA programs of “quietly 
confiscating property from a dispersed political minority”).  But see Daniel A. Farber, 
Economic Analysis and Just Compensation, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 125, 125 (1992) 
(suggesting that “legislatures normally offer compensation to landowners whose property is 
taken for a project, because they would form a powerful lobby against the project if not 
‘bought off.’ ”).   
189  See supra  notes 176-77 and accompanying text. 
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Perhaps the courts190 and legislature’s have good intentions in devising a scheme 
whereby interest generated by money held in an attorney’s trust account could be used 
to fund legal services for the disadvantaged.  However, the Supreme Court has stated 
on prior occasion that “a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not 
enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of 
paying for the change.”191  
 
D.  Is “Just Compensation” Due?       
 
If the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concludes that a taking has occurred, the court 
must then decide the third issue of whether “just compensation” is due.192  In 
considering the issue of just compensation, the Court has traditionally sought to place 
the claimant “in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken.”193 
 Further, the claimant’s loss is to be calculated objectively,194 independent of the 
claimant’s subjective valuation.195 
 
Applying this traditional measure of compensation to  Phillip’s, the Fifth Circuit 
Court on remand will need to consider what the client’s position would have been in the 
absence of his compelled participation in an IOLTA program.196  Those arguing for the 
                    
190  Some IOLTA’s are created by judicial decree.  See Doherty, supra  note 38, at 490. 
191  Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2146 (1998) (quoting Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922)). 
192  Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1934.  The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
prohibits a “taking” without “just compensation.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.; supra  note 101, 
158.  The doctrine of just compensation has been extensively explored by legal commentators 
in recent years.  See, e.g., Lior J. Strahilevitz, Note, When the Taking Itself Is Just 
Compensation, 107 YALE L.J. 1975 (1998); Shubba Ghosh, Takings, The Exit Option and Just 
Compensation, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 157 (1997); Clynn D. Lunney, Jr., Compensation For 
Takings: How Much Is Just?, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 721 (1993). 
193  Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1936 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. 564.54 
Acres land, 441 U.S. 506, 510 (1979)); see also  Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 
148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893) (stating claimant is entitled to a “full and exact equivalent” of that of 
which was taken). 
194  This approach has drawn sharp criticism from legal scholars.  See Lunney, Jr., supra 
note 192, at 722-23 (stating “the Court has tried to pretend that its decisions regarding the 
proper measure of compensation are consistent with one another . . . a suggestion that . . . is 
no more plausible . . . than when made with respect to the Court’s rulings on whether a taking 
has occurred.”); see also  D. Benjamin Barros, Note, Defining “Property” In the Just 
Compensation Clause, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1853, 1853-54 (1995) (suggesting that the lack of a 
consistent definition of ‘property’ has led to confusion on the issue of what is just 
compensation). 
195  Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1936 (Souter, J., dissenting).  But see Marilyn F. Drees, Do State 
Legislatures Have a Role in Resolving the ‘Just Compensation’ Dilemma? Some Lessons 
From Public Choice and Positive Political Theory, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 787, 789 (1997) 
(stating that legislative efforts can be used to complement those of the courts in resolving the 
“just compensation dilemma”). 
196  Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1936 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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continued viability of IOLTAs 197 will undoubtedly assert that because the client could 
not earn interest prior to IOLTA, 198 that compensation is not required to return the 
client to his status quo.199  However, this argument is not entirely supported.   
 
First a client, as an individual, can earn interest on his NOW200 account, and 
although it is not always economically feasible to do so,201 at least the choice remains 
with the client.202  Second, the fact that a lawyer’s pooled client trust account was 
incapable of generating interest prior to the adoption of the IOLTA concept should not 
be permitted to preclude the client from obtaining what is rightfully his property.203  
The United States Supreme Court did not let this fact stand in the way of declaring that 
a client has a property interest in IOLTA generated interest,204 and neither should the 
Fifth Circuit let it stand in the way of a client receiving just compensation for the 
subsequent confiscation of that property interest.  Finally, to say that a client is not 
entitled to any form of compensation would render meaningless the client’s property 
interest in “possession, control, and disposition” of that property.205  These are interests 
that have been deemed “valuable rights” by the United States Supreme Court.206 
 
Once the court makes the determination that just compensation is due, the focus of 
the inquiry will turn to the amount of compensation required.207  In the case of 
IOLTAs, the fact that the property taken was money makes the quantitative valuation of 
the compensation due rather simple.  The just compensation, or amount required to 
make the client whole, is the exact amount of interest taken,208 minus any fees the client 
                    
197  In the Phillip’s case, this would be the Texas Access to Justice Foundation.    
198  See supra  note 31 and accompanying text. 
199  See, e.g., Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1936 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
200  For a discussion of NOW accounts, see supra  notes 29, 30 and accompanying text. 
201  This is due to the fact there are generally banking fees associated with the 
maintenance of a NOW account, and because the interest generated by these types of 
accounts is relatively small. 
202  As opposed to the situation where a clients participation in a state’s IOLTA program 
is mandated.  See supra  notes 40, 70 and accompanying text. 
203  Recall that the United States Supreme Court has held that a client has a property 
interest in IOLTA generated interest.  Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1934. 
204  Id. 
205  Id. at 1933.  
206  Id. 
207  For a look at the different methods courts use to arrive at a compensation figure that is 
just, see Lunney, Jr., supra note 192; Lynda J. Oswald, Goodwill and On-Going Concern 
Value: Emerging Factors in the Just Compensation Equation, 32 B.C. L. REV. 283 (1991). 
208  For example, if the government effects a taking of a claimant’s pocket change 
consisting of three quarters, two dimes, and a nickel, the amount of compensation required to 
place the claimant “in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken” 
would be one dollar.  See, e.g., Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1936 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting 
United States v. 564.54 Acres land, 441 U.S. 506, 510 (1979)).  Notice the valuation of the 
property becomes more difficult when the property is not money, but perhaps the goodwill of 
a business.  For more on this point, see Oswald, supra  note 207, at 284 (1991) (stating that a 
“number of state courts and legislatures have begun to recognize that losses of goodwill, 
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would have incurred by maintaining an interest bearing NOW account.209    
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Consideration of the Penn Central factor’s as they apply to IOLTAs reveal that the 
state’s confiscation of IOLTA generated interest does effect a taking.210  Similarly, 
there does not seem to be a way of justly compensating the client absent the state’s 
relinquishment of all IOLTA generated interest.211  
 
While there does not appear to be any “quick fix” to the current crisis confronting 
IOLTAs, legislative and  administrative inconveniences212 resulting from potential 
solutions cannot be permitted to stand in the way of the constitutional command of the 
Fifth Amendment, that “private property [not] be taken for public use, without just 
compensation”.213 
 
Even if IOLTAs somehow emerge intact from the immediate threat in Texas under 
the Fifth Amendment,214 they will undoubtedly be challenged again on First Amendment 
grounds,215 now that the United States Supreme Court has declared that a client has a 
property interest in IOLTA generated interest.216  
 
Because it seems likely that the Fifth Circuit, on remand,  will find a taking requiring 
just compensation within the constrictors of the Fifth Amendment, an assessment needs 
to be made of alternative sources of funding for legal aid organizations217 that will be 
left financially abandoned in the wake of IOLTA’s apparent demise.  
                                                 
going-concern value, or profits are real losses for which property owners should be 
compensated.”).  
209  Cf. Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 819 F.2d 1002, 1006 (11th Cir. 1987). 
210  See supra  Part IV.C. 
211  See supra  Part IV.D. 
212  The administrative inconvenience would be to the attorney who would have to set up 
an individual NOW account for each individual client, undoubtedly at a considerable 
expense.  However, these costs could in turn be recouped by the attorney through an 
increase in legal fees.  Alternatively, upon commencement of the representation, the client 
could be asked to sign a waiver to any nominal interest his deposit would have generated, 
thus allowing the attorney to place the funds in a pooled client trust account, reduce his 
administrative costs, and spare the client the increased fees.  All of this of course, 
presupposes the crucial fact that a client’s deposit need generate enough interest to offset 
any banking fees associated with maintaining the NOW account. 
213  U.S. CONST. amend V. 
214  See supra  Part IV. 
215  See supra  Part III.A. 
216  Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 118 S. Ct. 1925, 1934 (1998).  In Washington 
Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts Bar Foundation, the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
denied appellants relief on the grounds that a client does not have a property interest in 
IOLTA generated interest.  993 F.2d 962, 980 (1st Cir. 1993).  This proposition has now been 
rejected by the United States Supreme Court.  Phillips, 118 S.Ct. at 1934. 
217  See supra  notes 2-7, 13 and accompanying text. 
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